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Proof of crime may be divided into three parts: (1) a specific
kind of injury or loss, the burned dwelling house in arson, for
example, or the body in homicide; (2) the criminal agency of
another as the means; and (3) the identity of the defendant as
the perpetrator.' Only the first two elements however constitute
the corpus delicti,2 and it is only the corpus delicti which need
be established by "some evidence" in addition to defendant's
extra-judicial confession or admission. No jurisdiction requires
proof in addition to defendant's extra-judicial confession or ad-
mission that defendant was the perpetrator.3
The central problem in the corpus delicti area is to deter-
mine the quantum of evidence in addition to the confession or
admission which is needed in order to sustain a conviction. The
basic purpose here is to review the Nebraska cases on the ques-
tion, to compare them with decisions elsewhere, and to predict
the probable course of future decisions in Nebraska.
First, however, an historical word. The English cases orig-
inally held that a conviction could be had merely upon the extra-
judicial confession or admission of the defendant. English ju-
dicial attitudes changed however, at least in homicide cases,
after a number of incidents where the alleged victims of homi-
cides turned up after the execution of their supposed slayers,4
a situation which caused Lord Matthew Hale to write that he
"would never convict any person of murder or manslaughter,
unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the body found
dead."5
1 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940), § 2072.
2 Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950). For a collection
of State cases on the elements required see 103 U. of Pa. Law Review
649, footnote 63.
3 23 C.J.S. 180, § 916.
4 For listings of English and American cases involving conviction upon
a false confession see: 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940), § 867,
note 1. 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed. 1940), § 2081, note 4.
5 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 290 (1847).
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While the English courts never went to the extreme of hold-
ing that the deceased's body must necessarily be produced in
order to warrant a homicide conviction, a rule was finally es-
tablished that "a person accused of homicide ought not to be
convicted merely on his own confession, without proof of the
finding of the dead body or evidence 'aliunde' that the party
alleged to have been murdered is in fact dead."6  Proof of evi-
dence aliunde the confession of criminal agency was also required.
But to this day the English courts have never required proof
aliunde the confession or admission in other than homicide and
bigamy cases, and the requirement in bigamy cases simply rests
on the best evidence rule, i.e., the records of defendant's mar-
riages are better evidence of them than defendant's extra-judicial
statement that they took place.7
III. AMERICAN LAW IN GENERAL
However, the English rules were long in developing and the
unsettled nature of the English law left American courts free
to fashion their own doctrines.8 It was early agreed that "some
evidence" of the corpus delicti was needed in addition to defend-
ant's extra-judicial confession or admission and that the require-
ment of such other proof was not limited to homicide and bigamy
prosecutions but extended to all criminal cases. 9 The principal
dispute, as suggested above, has been over the quantum and
nature of the other evidence required to establish the corpus de-
licti. Only three states'0 have ever insisted that the corpus
delicti be proved beyond a reasonable doubt without 'reference to
6 Ireland 8 R.C.L. 50, 58.
7 7 Wigmore, Evidence (rd ed. 1940), § 2084.
8 For a collection of early American cases illustrating how the courts
searched for a rule see: 1 Roscoe, Crim. Evid. (8th ed. 1888), p. 66,
note 1 (8th ed. 1888).
9 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 315: "A confession alone ought
not to be sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti. There should be
other proof that a crime has been committed, and the confession should
only be allowed for the purpose of connecting the defendant with
the offense."
Greenleaf, Evidence, § 217: "... this opinion certainly best ac-
cords with the humanity of the criminal code and with the great de-
gree of caution applied in receiving and weighing the evidence of
confessions in other cases."
10 Commonwealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 Atl. 657 (1926); State v.
Lalujer, 4 Minn. 368 (1860); Dunn v. State, 34 Tex.Cr. 257, 30 S.W. 227
(1895).
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the confession or admission and only Pennsylvania appears to
cling to such a rule today." The other states all allow the con-
fession to come in as cumulative proof of the corpus delicti.
1 2
Putting the anomolous Pennsylvania rule to one side, there
appears to be two views concerning the nature of the proof re-
quired in addition to defendant's extra-judicial confession or ad-
mission. One group of courts insists that such other evidence be
11 Commonwealth v. Lettrick, 346 Pa. 497, 502, 31 A.2d 155, 157 (1943).
"In practice, the rule requires that the jury may not consider such
confession as evidence of the defendant's guilt of the crime charged,
unless the Commonwealth shall have produced evidence sufficient to
convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime charged
was committed by someone."
12 Alabama: Whitehead v. State, 16 Ala.App. 427, 78 So. 467 (1918;
Daniels v. State, 12 Ala.App. 119, 121, 68 So. 499, 499 (1915), "any
evidence at all, even the slightest tendency."
Arizona: State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757 (1947), must have
"reasonable proof" of the corpus delicti aliunde.
California: People v. Kay, 34 Cal.App.2d 691, 94 P.2d 361 (1939).
Connecticut: State v. Guastamachio, 137 Conn. 179, 182, 75 A.2d 429,
430 (1950), evidence of a "substantial character."
Deleware: State v. Kehm, 103 A.2d 781 (DeL Super. 1954).
Florida: Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25, 105 So. 130 (1925).
Georgia: McVeigh v. State, 205 Ga. 326, 53 S.E.2d 462 (1949).
Indiana: Dennis v. State, 230 Ind. 210, 216, 102 N.E.2d 650, 653 (1952),
"clear proof".
Idaho: State v. Keller, 8 Id. 699, 70 Pac. 1051 (1902).
Kansas: State v. Cardwell, 90 Kan. 606, 135 P. 597 (1913).
Maine: State v. Carlton, 148 Me. 237, 92 A.2d 327 (1952), evidence
giving rise to a reasonable inference of the existence of the corpus
delicti.
Maryland: Weller v. State, 150 Md. 278, 132 Atl. 624 (1926).
Michigan: People v. Coapman, 326 Mich. 321, 40 N.W.2d 167 (1949).
Missouri: State v. McGuire, 327 Mo. 1176, 39 S.W.2d 472 (1950).
Montana: State v. Ratkovich, 111 Mont. 9, 105 P.2d 597 (1940), "some"
independent evidence which together with the confession will es-
tablish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nebraska: Sullivan v. State, 58 Neb. 796, 79 N.W. 721 (1899).
Nevada: In re Kelly, 28 Nev. 491, 83 Pac. 223 (1905).
New Mexico: State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952).
North Carolina: State v. Cope, 81 S.E.2d 773 (N.C. 1954).
Ohio: State v. Maranda, 94 Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038 (1916).
Oklahoma: Riddinger v. State, 267 P.2d 175 (Okla. Crim. App. 1953).
Rhode Island: State v. Jacobs, 21 R.I. 259 (1899).
South Carolina: State v. Blocker, 205 S.C. 303, 31 S.E.2d 908 (1944).
Tennessee: Taylor v. State, 191 Tenn. 670, 235 S.W.2d 818 (1950).
Vermont: State v. Blay, 77 Vt. 56, 58 Atl. 794 (1904).
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entirely independent of the confession or admission, that the con-
fession or admission may not be lifted by its own bootstraps in
order to give criminal color to otherwise non-inculpatory circum-
stances.' 3 Under this view, a conviction may not be had no
matter how persuasively the confession or admission may be
corroborated unless the proof aliunde of itself tends independ-
ently to establish the corpus delicti. Probably a majority of the
courts on the other hand only require that the proof aliunde be
such as to corroborate the confession or admission.14  If, for ex-
Virginia: Campbell v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 824, 74 S.E.2d 468
(1953).
Washington: State v. Lutes, 38 Wash.2d 475, 230 P.2d 786 (1951).
West Virginia: State v. Blackwell, 102 W.Va. 421, 135 S.E. 393 (1926).
Wyoming: Curran v. State, 12 Wyo. 553, 562, 76 Pac. 577, 578 (1904),
"such extrinsic corroborating circumstances as well, in connec-
tion with the confession, show the prisoner's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."
Federal: Gullotta v. U. S., 113 F.2d 683, 685-86 (8th Cir. 1940), "a
substantial showing which together with the defendant's confes-
sion or admission establishes the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
13 Federal: Tingle v. U. S., 38 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1930).
Alabama: Johnson v. State, 59 Ala. 37 (1877), extrajudicial confession,
not corroborate4 by independent evidence of corpus delicti-in-
sufficient.
Dist. of Columbia: Forte v. U. S., 68 D.C.App. 111, 94 F.2d 236 (1938),
independent evidence must deal with the whole of the corpus
delicti.
Georgia: Bines v. State, 118 Ga. 320, 45 S.E. 376 (1903), arson-evi-
dence other than confession must show burning to have been
felonious.
Minnesota: State v. Wylie, 151 Minn. 375, 186 N.W. 707 (1922).
Virginia: Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1089, 177 S.E. 847
(1935).
14 Federal: (leading case) U. S. v. Williams, 1 Cliff. 5 (1858).
Colorado: Bunch v. People, 87 Colo. 84, 285 Pac. 766 (1930).
Illinois: Bergen v. People, 17 Ill. 426 (1856), Skinner, J., required
"some proof that a crime had been committed, or of circumstances
corroborating and fortifying the confession; . . . proof of any num-
ber of these facts and circumstances consistent with the truth
of the confession, or which the confession had led to the dis-
covery of, and which would not probably have existed had not
the crime been committed, necessarily corroborated it; ... the
corroborating fact or facts in proof need not necessarily, inde-
pendent of the confession, tend to prove the 'corpus delicti'."
New York: People v. Deacons, 109 N.Y. 374, 377, 16 N.E. 676 (1888),
"The measuring of the Code is that there must be some other
evidence of the corpus delicti besides the confession."
Texas: Harris v. State, 64 Tex.Cr. 594, 144 S.W. 232 (1912), confes-
sion may be used to aid the proof of the corpus delicti.
COMMENTS
ample, defendant confesses that he shot X in the front-room of
a particular wilderness cabin and then buried X's body in a shal-
low grave the location of which he describes and a bloodstain is
found in the cabin front-room and a decomposed body in the
grave, this would probably be enough proof aliunde to warrant
a conviction under the latter view. It would not however be
enough in a jurisdiction requiring some independent proof of
the corpus delicti. A decomposed body in a shallow grave and
a bloodstain on a cabin floor are in themselves non-inculpatory
and do nothing more than corroborate defendant's confession.
Although most courts have said that proof of the corpus
delicti aiiunde the confession should precede the introduction
of the confession, this "rule" has been principally honored in the
breach and it has almost uniformly been held that a reversal of
the order of proof, provided the requisite proof aliunde is intro-
duced at some stage, does not constitute reversible error.'5
The corpus deliciti may be proved by direct evidence or if
none is available by circumstantial evidence. Where however the
corpus delicti is proved by circumstantial evidence it must be so
conclusive as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis, other than
that a crime has been committed, and the evidence fails to estab-
lish the corpus delicti sufficiently if it suggests a theory which is
as consistent with the absence of a crime as with its existence.'
III. THE LAW IN NEBRASKA
Nebraska cases have historically observed two fundament-
ally different rubrics in discussing the nature and quantum of
proof necessary in order to establish the corpus delicti aliunde
defendant's extra-judicial confession or admission. The first, an-
nounced in the early cases and recognized only in the breach, is
that defendant's confession or admission is not to be considered
except for the purpose of proving defendant's identity as the per-
petrator of the crime. Under this view, the confession or admis-
sion could not come in as cumulative proof of the corpus delicti
and, though the Court never squarely so stated, it would follow
under this view that the corpus delicti had to be proved by evi-
dence alunde beyond a reasonable doubt. This view, as we have
seen, is today followed only in Pennsylvania. The leading Ne-
'a People v. McWilliams, 117 Cal.App. 732, 4 P.2d 601 (1931); Parker V.
State, 228 Ind. 1, 88 N.E.2d 556 (1949); Conunonwealth v. Lettrick,
346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943).
16 23 C.J.S. § 916(c)
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braska case announcing the doctrine is Dodge v. People:17 "There
should be other proof that a crime has actually been committed,
and the confession should only be allowed for the purpose of con-
necting the defendant with the offense." Chezen v. State' s and
Wilshusen v. State'0 announce the same doctrine, but it is signi-
ficant that in all of these cases defendant went to jail. While the
doctrine in question has never squarely been repudiated, and
though the cases professing it are still frequently cited by the
Court, it is very clear from the modern decisions that it has long
fallen into disuse.
Modern Nebraska law on the question dates from Sullivan
v. State,20 a homicide case decided in 1899. Defendant quarreled
with some Negroes, obtained a revolver in a saloon and ran out
declaring that he intended to kill a "black nigger." A man was
seen walking in an alley, there was a flash and report of a pistol,
and the man fell to the sidewalk and was found dead. Just after
the shot, defendant ran back into the saloon, threw the pistol on
the floor, and exclaimed, "My God! I have killed Tom Kirkland,
my best friend." He then ran outside to the dying man and
again declared he had shot or killed his best friend and that he
would be hanged. No other person was seen on the street in the
vicinity when the shot was fired. There was no direct evidence
presented of any wound on the body of the deceased, and the
above circumstances, together with the subsequent confession of
the defendant that he shot Kirkland under the impression that
he was a Negro constituted all of the evidence tending to show
that death was the result of a gunshot wound. The court stated
that although a voluntary extra-judicial confession is insufficient
standing alone to prove the corpus delicti, it is nevertheless com-
petent proof of the corpus delicti, and may, with only slight cor-
roborative evidence, establish the corpus delicti as well as defend-
ant's guilty participation.
The slight corroborative evidence found by the Court con-
sisted solely in defendant's above-stated admissions at the time
of the alleged shooting which were held to be "part of the res
gestae." 21 Though the Court indicated no recognition of having
17 4 Neb. 220, 231 (1875).
Is 56 Neb. 496, 76 N.W. 1056 (1898).
19 149 Neb. 594, 31 N.W.2d 544 (1948).
20 58 Neb. 796, 79 N.W. 721 (1899).
21 Res gestae-events speaking for themselves, through the instinctive
words and acts of participants, not the words and acts of participants
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made a shift in approach, the pendulum was thus swung from a
rule requiring independent proof aliunde the confession beyond
a reasonable doubt to one allowing the corpus delicti to be proved
by lifting the confession by its own bootstraps with only "slight
corroborative proof." And the Court's formulation of its rule,
"only slight corroborative proof," is perhaps the least stringent
in the sense of requiring least proof aliunde of any court in the
United States. That the Court meant what it said is underscored
by the fact that defendant's confession in the Sullivan case was
not only lifted by its own bootstraps, but the "slight evidence"
aliunde consisted solely in defendant's own admissions. The de-
fendant's confession in the other words was held to be sufficiently
corroborated aliunde solely by defendant's admissions.22
The most recent Nebraska cases adhere to Sullivan's "only
slight corroborative proof" rubric. In Gallegos v. State,23 for ex-
ample, defendant was convicted of manslaughter of a woman
with whom he and his two daughters had been living. Nearly a
year after the alleged crime the defendant was arrested in El
Paso, Texas on another charge, and in the course of questioning
by police officers defendant confessed that he had killed the de-
ceased woman in a heated argument by striking her on the head
with a piece of stove wood, that he had wrapped her in a blanket,
placed a handkerchief in her mouth and buried her the next day
in a north-south grave just east of the house in which the crime
was committeed. A police officers went to the house and dis-
covered the grave as described by the defendant, and found a
dark brown stain on the kitchen floor where defendant stated
when narrating the events. What is done or said by participants,
under the immediate spur of a transaction, becomes thus part of the
transaction, because it is then the transaction that thus speaks. A
declaration to be part of the res gestae need not necessarily be co-
incident in point of time with the main fact proved. It is enough
that the two are so clearly connected that the declaration can, in the
ordinary course of affairs, be said to be a spontaneous explanation
of the real cause. Statements which were part of the res gestate
were held to be competent evidence also in the case of Egbert v. State,
113 Neb. 790, 205 N.W. 252 (1925). "Circumstances capable of an
innocent construction may be interpreted in the light of the defend-
ant's confession (statements which were part of the res gestate here),
and the fact under investigation be thus given a criminal aspect."
22 Admission and confession are distinguishable, the difference being that
the latter is an acknowledgment of guilt, while the former is but
acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance in itself insufficient to
constitute an acknowledgment of guilt, and tending only toward the
proof of the ultimate fact of guilt. 22 C.J.S. § 816(a), p. 1422.
23 152 Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950).
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deceased had fallen. Upon these facts defendant's conviction of
manslaughter was sustained.
Whether the Court's "slight corroborative" proof requirement
would have been held satisfied had defendant's confession fol-
lowed the discovery of the body and the blood stain, and news-
paper accounts of such discovery were published, was of course
left unanswered by the Court. The danger of convicting an in-
nocent man in such a case would naturally be notably enhanced.
It is noteworthy however as bearing on the answer that the Court
has seldom looked to the policy considerations underlying the
proof aliunde requirement but has applied its "slight corrobora-
tive proof" rule almost mechanically.
Two more recent cases likewise bear mention. The first,
Hoffman v. State,24 a motor vehicle homicide case, doubtless re-
quires less proof aliunde the confession of any Nebraska case and
goes considerably beyond most of the authorities elsewhere. De-
fendant and deceased were on a drinking spree and their car was
involved in a collision; defendant was found in the front seat
partially behind the steering wheel, and the body of deceased
was hanging out of the partially open right-hand door. The
automobile in which they were riding belonged to the defendant,
but defendant contended that he was asleep in the rear seat at
the time of the accident. The state introduced evidence however
that defendant told the sheriff two hours after the accident that
he was driving. While reiterating the rule that defendant's extra-
judicial25 confession or admission is not alone sufficient proof of
the corpus delicti, the court found the necessary "slight corro-
borative proof" in the following circumstances: (1) the position
of defendant in the car after the accident; (2) the position of the
only other passenger in the car; (3) the nature and location of
the injuries received by deceased; (4) the blood and light, or
blond, hair on the doorpose of the car in front of where deceased
was found; (5) the fact that deceased had light or blond hair
and that the hair of defendant was dark. The proof aliumde is
indeed slight. Most if not all of the circumstances relied on are
almost equally consistent with the hypothesis that defendant was
not driving.
24 160 Neb. 375, 70 N.W.2d 314 (1955).
25 Authorities are unanimous in holding that only an extra-judicial con-
fession requires corroboration. A confession in open court is suf-
ficient standing alone to convict. Skaggs v. State, 88 Ark. 62, 113
S.W. 346 (1908).
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The final case of interest is Cotner v. Solomon,20 a habeas
corpus action based on the theory that there was no evidence to
justify a magistrate's finding that there was sufficient cause to
hold petitioner on a charge of indecently fondling a minor. The
evidence relied upon to hold petitioner consisted of defendant's
extra-judicial confession to the charge and the testimony of a
five year old girl that defendant had tickled her somewhere
but she would not say where.
The Court's holding that there was sufficient cause to hold
petitioner would not be of interest here except for the way in
which the Court approached the question. The authorities are
uniform that an extra-judicial confession is sufficient to warrant
bindover for trial.27  However, the Court did not refer to this
well-established rule but instead dealt with the question as though
defendant had been convicted, stated the "slight corroborative
proof" rule and found it to be satisfied by the little girl's seem-
ingly non-inculpatory testimony that defendant tickled her she
knew not where.
If Cotner is taken on the basis that the Court proceeded on,
which, of course, it need not be, it appears that Nebraska cur-
rently requires almost no evidence aliunde defendant's confes-
sion to warrant a conviction.
Richard A. Huebner, '60
26 163 Neb. 619, 80 N.W.2d 587 (1957).
27 E.g., Latimer v. State, 55 Neb. 609, 76 N.W. 207 (1898); State ex rel.
Germain v. Ross, 39 N.D. 630, 170 N.W. 121 (1918).
